spoofdpi is a high-performance, cross-platform proxy tool written in Go that bypasses Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) by fragmenting and desynchronizing TLS handshakes and UDP packets. It operates in three modes: HTTP proxy, SOCKS5 proxy, and TUN interface (transparent proxy). The architecture is modular and clean, with clear separation of concerns: a config layer (TOML + CLI flags), a rule engine for domain/CIDR-based policy matching, a DNS resolver with multiple backends (UDP, DoH, system), a packet capture/injection layer using pcap or Linux raw sockets, and a desync engine that applies configurable split strategies (SNI, chunk, random, custom) and fake packets. The codebase demonstrates strong engineering practices: extensive use of interfaces for platform-specific code (Darwin/Linux/FreeBSD stubs), generic data structures (sharded LRU cache, TTL cache, domain trie with wildcard/globstar), concurrent connection management with idle timeouts, and structured logging with trace IDs. It includes a TUI mode using Bubble Tea. The project is actively maintained with recent commits, comprehensive CI/CD, and thorough test coverage for configuration parsing, rule matching, and desync logic. The code is of high quality and contains several reusable components.
GreenTunnel is a local proxy that bypasses DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) censorship. It works by intercepting HTTPS CONNECT tunnels, detecting the TLS ClientHello, and splitting it into fragments (either TCP segments or valid TLS records) so that the SNI (Server Name Indication) containing the target hostname never appears whole in a single packet. DNS resolution is performed over encrypted channels (DoH/DoT) to prevent ISP-level blocking. The repository contains a complete TypeScript rewrite of the engine, a CLI tool (`gt`), and an Electron desktop app. The engine is deliberately separated from the OS proxy configuration (handled by `SystemProxy`) and from the CLI output, making it testable and crash-safe. The codebase demonstrates strong engineering practices: proper error handling (no silent catch-and-return), backpressure-aware socket writes, framing-aware HTTP request rewriting, and a crash-proof system-proxy snapshot/restore mechanism. The desktop app features a live log panel with virtual scrolling, a tray icon, and a modal star/share prompt scheduled over three asks. The repository is actively maintained with modern tooling (Node 24, TypeScript 6, Electron 43, Vitest 4) and has a comprehensive test suite and CI/CD pipeline.
Hiddify-Manager is a comprehensive anti-censorship proxy/VPN management system designed for multi-user environments. It orchestrates a suite of proxy cores (Xray, Sing-Box, HAProxy, Nginx, WireGuard, etc.) via systemd services, a Flask-based web panel, and a CLI tool. The system supports over 20 protocols (VLESS, VMess, Trojan, Shadowsocks, Reality, Telegram proxies, DNS tunnels) and is optimized for regions with heavy internet censorship (Iran, China, Russia). It provides automated installation, configuration generation via Jinja2 templates, multi-node support, Docker deployment, and cloud-init/Terraform scripts for cloud provisioning. The codebase is actively maintained with frequent updates, but contains deprecated services and a large shell script surface that introduces maintenance complexity.
Se7en Pro is a Windows 10/11 anti-censorship VPN client that aggregates eleven circumvention protocols into one desktop application. In production it runs a Flutter glassmorphic GUI (Se7enFlutter) that talks over authenticated named pipes to a .NET 8 daemon (Se7enCore), which orchestrates child processes for Psiphon, Tor, Xray/sing-box, Aether (MASQUE/WireGuard/WARP), and SHARD (Cloudflare TLS fragmentation over VLESS/Trojan nodes). Chained multi-hop modes (Psiphon-over-WARP, Tor-over-V2Ray, etc.) are first-class features, and a Wintun/tun2socks TUN adapter provides system-managed routing with split tunneling by app, domain, and IP along with a kill switch, system proxy, DNS handling, LAN sharing, and admin elevation. Architecturally the daemon's ConnectionManager selects active engines behind an IConnectionEngine abstraction; LocalSocksEngineBase supplies a shared process-spawn/SOCKS5-probe/auto-restart lifecycle for every engine. The Flutter side is a Riverpod-driven dashboard with live speed/ping telemetry, engine-filtered log viewing, region picking, and a large settings surface. Primary data flows are: UI command → PipeCoreClient → IpcDaemonService JSON dispatch → ConnectionManager → engine process → local SOCKS5/HTTP proxy → system proxy or TUN; status and logs stream back over the same pipe. The daemon persists settings to settings.json, caches Aether edge pools, and fetches SHARD node lists from GitHub. The repo is hybrid in a narrow sense: it bundles curated operational datasets (Akamai/Cloudflare/Fastly IP ranges, Akamai seed IPs, SHARD seed nodes, Tor bridge strings) used at runtime for CDN fronting and edge discovery. These are static resource inputs to the application machinery, not research artifacts or pipeline outputs, so the dominant character is application. Craftsmanship is solid but uneven. The engine abstraction, IPC layer, Authenticode trust checks, DPAPI secret storage, and route-pinning logic are genuinely reusable. However, multi-thousand-line widget files (settings_page.dart ~2200 lines, split_tunnel_section.dart ~1200 lines), incomplete i18n coverage with hardcoded English/Chinese/Russian strings, version drift (UI reports v1.0.4 while the engine UA says 1.1.0), brittle relative resource paths, and bundled third-party binaries with limited update channels create real maintenance friction. Test coverage is thin (a few model/round-trip widget tests).
This repository is a static collection of proxy subscription links and configuration files for V2Ray and Clash proxy clients. It contains a README.md with promotional material for various VPN services, a list of free proxy URIs in v.txt, a Clash YAML configuration file (c.yaml) with hundreds of proxy entries, and a vpn.md with a promotional link. The repository serves as a free source of proxy configurations for circumventing internet censorship. It does not contain any original software code. The architecture is trivial: it is a file-based subscription endpoint. The primary data flow is users downloading these files and importing them into proxy clients.